Razlika između matematičke i filozofske logike?

A, jesi li čuo možda za Nedeljkov paradoks? On zahteva malo više znanja da bi se razumeo.

---

Dobro. Pokazao si hrabrost. Postujem to sto si imao hrabrosti da izadjes iz okova formalnog obrazovanja, i da kazes svoje misljenje. Ok.

Matematicka formulacija paradoxa kao pojma: Ø

I tebi se divim kao i Nedeljku. Vi nemate nedoumica u vezi dualnosti ili ne-dualnosti istine, i Curryevog paradoksa. Vi ste nacisto s tim, i znate konacno razresenje. Moram da priznam da ste me zbunili. I zadivili.

Definicija paradoksa u opštem slučaju kao praznog skupa znači samo da formalni sistem nije dao odgovor u konačnom vremenu a ne znači konačno rešenje.

Konstruisati formalni sistem koji daje odgovor na pitanje da li je data rečenica iskaz.

Pa, ako misliš na rečenicu prirodnog jezika, rekao bih da je to nemoguće.

---

Naravno da mislim na rečenice prirodnog jezike i da je nemoguće konstruisati formalni sistem koji će utvrditi da li je data rečenica iskaz ili ne.

Posmatrajmo sledeće: Ako u godini ima 12 meseci onda su slonovi veći od miševa je formalno matematički ispravna ali u prirodnom jeziku je besmislena.

Ne vidim razlog zašto je besmislena.

---

Naprotiv. Da si se obrazovao, znao bi da tu nema nikakvog paradoksa.

Šta je po vama definicija paradoksa?

---

Ok. Izgleda da si samo ti obrazovan. A svi ovi ljudi izgleda da nisu obrazovani, i da su pisali o necemu sto ne postoji. Ma nema sujete i autizma ovde na forumu nauke. Lol.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/curry-paradox/


* Barwise, J., and Etchemendy, J., 1984. The Liar, New York:Oxford University Press.
* Beall, JC, forthcoming. Spandrels of Truth, Oxford:Oxford University Press.
* Beall, JC, and Brady, R. T., and Hazen, A. P., and Priest, G., and Restall, G., 2006. “Relevant Restricted Quantification”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 35:587-598.
* Boolos, G., and Jeffrey, R., 1989. Computability and Logic, 3rd edition, New York: Cambridge University Press.
* Burge, T., 1979. “Semantical Paradox”, Journal of Philosophy 76:169-198.
* Brady, R. T., 1989. “The non-triviality of dialectical set theory”, in G. Priest and R. Routley and J. Norman (eds), Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent Philosophia Verlag, pp. 437-470.
* Curry, H., 1942, “The inconsistency of certain formal logics”, Journal of Symbolic Logic 7, pp. 115-117.
* Field, H., 2008. Saving Truth from Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
* Frederickson, G., 1997, Dissections: Plane and Fancy, Cambridge: CUP.
* Gardner, M., 1956. Mathematics, Magic and Mystery, New York, Dover Publ.
* Gaifman, H., 1988. “Operational pointer semantics: Solution to self-referential puzzles I”, in Vardi, M., ed, Proceedings of the Second Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge, Morgan Kaufmann, pp.43-59.
* Glanzberg, M., 2001. “The liar in context”, Philosophical Studies 103:217-251.
* Goldstein, L. 1986. “Epimenides and Curry”. Analysis 463:117-121.
* Gupta, A. and Belnap, N., 1993. The Revision Theory of Truth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
* Hajek, P. and Paris, J. and Shepherdson, J., 2000. “The liar paradox and fuzzy logic”, Journal of Symbolic Logic 65:339-346.
* Kripke, S., 1975. “Outline of a theory of truth”, Journal of Philosophy 72:690-716.
* Martin, R., 1984. Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, Oxford:Oxford University Press.
* Meyer, R. K., Routley, R. and Dunn, J.M., 1979, “Curry's paradox”, Analysis 39, pp. 124- 128.
* Myhill, J., 1975. “Levels of Implication”. In A. R. Anderson, R. C. Barcan-Marcus, annd R. M. Martin, editors, The Logical Enterprise, pp. 179-185. Yale Univ. Press.
* Myhill, J., 1984. “Paradoxes”. Synthese, 60:129-143.
* Parsons, C., 1974. “The Liar Paradox”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 3:381-412. Reprinted with new Postscript in Parsons 1983, pp. 221-67, and in Martin 1984, pp. 9-45.
* Parsons, C., 1983. Mathematics in Philosophy, Cornell University Press.
* Priest, G., 1992. “What is a non-normal world?”, Logique & Analyse 139-40:291-302.
* Priest, G. and Sylvan, R., 1992. “Simplified semantics for basic relevant logics”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 21:217-232.
* Priest, G., 2006. In Contradiction (2nd ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press.
* Prior, A. N., 1955. “Curry's Paradox and 3-Valued Logic”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 33:177-82.
* Read, S., 2001, “Self-Reference and Validity Revisited”, in Medieval Formal Logic, M. Yrjonsuuri (ed.), Kluwer 2001, pp. 183-96.
* Restall, G., 1992. “Arithmetic and truth in Lukasiewicz's infinitely valued logic”, Logique et Analyse 139-140:303-312.
* Restall, G., 2000, An Introduction to Substructural Logics, Routledge.
* Restall, G. 2007. “Curry's Revenge: the costs of non-classical solutions to the paradoxes of self-reference”, in JC Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 262-271.
* Restall, G. and Rogerson, S., 2004. “Routes to Triviality”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 33:421-436.
* Restall, G., 1993. “Simplified Semantics for Relevant Logics (and some of their rivals)”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 22:481-511.
* Routley, R. and Loparic, A., 1978. “Semantical analyses of Arruda-daCosta P-systems and adjacent non-replacement systems”, Studia Logica 37:301-320.
* Routley, R. and Meyer, R. K., 1973. “Semantics of entailment”, in H. Leblanc (ed), Truth, Syntax, and Modality North Holland, 194-243.
* Simmons, K., 1993. Universaliity and the Liar, New York: Cambridge University Press.
* Moh Shaw-Kwei. “Logical Paradoxes for Many-Valued Systems”. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 19 (1954), pp. 37-39.
* Slaney, John. 1989. “RWX is not Curry Paraconsistent”, in G. Priest, R. Routley, and J. Norman (eds.), Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent, Philosophia Verlag, 472-480.
* Weir, A., 2005. “Naive truth and sophisticated logic”, in JC Beall and B. Armour-Garb (eds), Deflationism and Paradox Oxford:Oxford University Press, pp. 218-249.

Other Internet Resources

* Restall, G., 1994, On Logics Without Contraction, (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Queensland)


http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/curry-paradox/

Pozivaš se na nešto što ne razumeš.

---

To što je "paradoks" berberina inspirisao Vjačislava Grišina za BCK logiku, apsolutno ne znači da tu ima ikakvog paradoksa, sem eventualno prividnog.

---

Pustimo sad mene, sta ja razumem, a sta ne. Nastavi da obrazlazes kako Curryev paradoks ne postoji, i kako se svi ovi ljudi zamlacuju sa glupostima. Ovo je prava slika trenutnog stanja na forumu nauke. A tako je vec godinama. Niko nista ne moze da progovori od bezgranicno sujetnih clanova forumskog lobija, i sve poruke se brisu. Osim naravno ako se ne slazete sa njima. Mislim da to nije korisno za ovaj forum.




* Barwise, J., and Etchemendy, J., 1984. The Liar, New York:Oxford University Press.
* Beall, JC, forthcoming. Spandrels of Truth, Oxford:Oxford University Press.
* Beall, JC, and Brady, R. T., and Hazen, A. P., and Priest, G., and Restall, G., 2006. “Relevant Restricted Quantification”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 35:587-598.
* Boolos, G., and Jeffrey, R., 1989. Computability and Logic, 3rd edition, New York: Cambridge University Press.
* Burge, T., 1979. “Semantical Paradox”, Journal of Philosophy 76:169-198.
* Brady, R. T., 1989. “The non-triviality of dialectical set theory”, in G. Priest and R. Routley and J. Norman (eds), Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent Philosophia Verlag, pp. 437-470.
* Curry, H., 1942, “The inconsistency of certain formal logics”, Journal of Symbolic Logic 7, pp. 115-117.
* Field, H., 2008. Saving Truth from Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
* Frederickson, G., 1997, Dissections: Plane and Fancy, Cambridge: CUP.
* Gardner, M., 1956. Mathematics, Magic and Mystery, New York, Dover Publ.
* Gaifman, H., 1988. “Operational pointer semantics: Solution to self-referential puzzles I”, in Vardi, M., ed, Proceedings of the Second Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge, Morgan Kaufmann, pp.43-59.
* Glanzberg, M., 2001. “The liar in context”, Philosophical Studies 103:217-251.
* Goldstein, L. 1986. “Epimenides and Curry”. Analysis 463:117-121.
* Gupta, A. and Belnap, N., 1993. The Revision Theory of Truth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
* Hajek, P. and Paris, J. and Shepherdson, J., 2000. “The liar paradox and fuzzy logic”, Journal of Symbolic Logic 65:339-346.
* Kripke, S., 1975. “Outline of a theory of truth”, Journal of Philosophy 72:690-716.
* Martin, R., 1984. Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, Oxford:Oxford University Press.
* Meyer, R. K., Routley, R. and Dunn, J.M., 1979, “Curry's paradox”, Analysis 39, pp. 124- 128.
* Myhill, J., 1975. “Levels of Implication”. In A. R. Anderson, R. C. Barcan-Marcus, annd R. M. Martin, editors, The Logical Enterprise, pp. 179-185. Yale Univ. Press.
* Myhill, J., 1984. “Paradoxes”. Synthese, 60:129-143.
* Parsons, C., 1974. “The Liar Paradox”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 3:381-412. Reprinted with new Postscript in Parsons 1983, pp. 221-67, and in Martin 1984, pp. 9-45.
* Parsons, C., 1983. Mathematics in Philosophy, Cornell University Press.
* Priest, G., 1992. “What is a non-normal world?”, Logique & Analyse 139-40:291-302.
* Priest, G. and Sylvan, R., 1992. “Simplified semantics for basic relevant logics”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 21:217-232.
* Priest, G., 2006. In Contradiction (2nd ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press.
* Prior, A. N., 1955. “Curry's Paradox and 3-Valued Logic”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 33:177-82.
* Read, S., 2001, “Self-Reference and Validity Revisited”, in Medieval Formal Logic, M. Yrjonsuuri (ed.), Kluwer 2001, pp. 183-96.
* Restall, G., 1992. “Arithmetic and truth in Lukasiewicz's infinitely valued logic”, Logique et Analyse 139-140:303-312.
* Restall, G., 2000, An Introduction to Substructural Logics, Routledge.
* Restall, G. 2007. “Curry's Revenge: the costs of non-classical solutions to the paradoxes of self-reference”, in JC Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 262-271.
* Restall, G. and Rogerson, S., 2004. “Routes to Triviality”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 33:421-436.
* Restall, G., 1993. “Simplified Semantics for Relevant Logics (and some of their rivals)”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 22:481-511.
* Routley, R. and Loparic, A., 1978. “Semantical analyses of Arruda-daCosta P-systems and adjacent non-replacement systems”, Studia Logica 37:301-320.
* Routley, R. and Meyer, R. K., 1973. “Semantics of entailment”, in H. Leblanc (ed), Truth, Syntax, and Modality North Holland, 194-243.
* Simmons, K., 1993. Universaliity and the Liar, New York: Cambridge University Press.
* Moh Shaw-Kwei. “Logical Paradoxes for Many-Valued Systems”. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 19 (1954), pp. 37-39.
* Slaney, John. 1989. “RWX is not Curry Paraconsistent”, in G. Priest, R. Routley, and J. Norman (eds.), Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent, Philosophia Verlag, 472-480.
* Weir, A., 2005. “Naive truth and sophisticated logic”, in JC Beall and B. Armour-Garb (eds), Deflationism and Paradox Oxford:Oxford University Press, pp. 218-249.

Other Internet Resources

* Restall, G., 1994, On Logics Without Contraction, (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Queensland)

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/curry-paradox/

http://www.skrtic.net/paradoksi/index.html


_{[Ovu poruku je menjao Sini82 dana 10.09.2010. u 13:10 GMT+1]}

Na ovaj način, bilo koja tvrdnja, bez obzira je li točna ili ne, može biti dokazana. Rješenje Curryevog paradoksa je trajni problem jer su rješenja (osim onih trivijalnih koja direktno ne dozvoljavaju X) komplicirana i neintuitivna. Logičari nisu odlučni oko toga jesu li takve rečenice nedozvoljive (i ako da, kako ih zabraniti), ili su beznačajne, ili su točne i otkrivaju probleme u samom konceptu istine (i ako da, treba li koncept istine odbaciti ili promijeniti).


http://www.skrtic.net/paradoksi/curry.html

Ti ne razumeš čime se ti ljudi bave.

Substrukturalne i ostale neklasične logike nisu izmišljene da bi se izvuklo iz paradoksalnog škripca, već imaju savim drugu motivaciju.

---

Pa naravno da ne razumem, zato sto je to iskljucivo tvoja privilegija, da razumes. Dakle nije bitno sto ti nisi u pravu, nego sto ja ne razumem to. Hajde da skrenemo temu na mene.

@boxxter

Najljubaznije te molim da svoju potrebu za privlačenjem pažnje zadovoljiš na neki drugi način a ne trolovanjem na ovoj temi koja zahvaljujući tebi postaje besmislena.



Znam da bi ti to voleo.



Više o tvom obrazovanju u temi "Kako izgleda učenje matematike čitanjem Vikipedije u slobodno vreme":

www.elitesecurity.org/t405228-...njem-Vikipedije-slobodno-vreme

---

Evo ovako je tekao razgovor, i evo u cemu je stvar. Raspravljali smo o razlici izmedju matematicke i filozofske logike. Onda je Nedeljko rekao da je to isto. Pa sam mu ja rekao da napise matematicku formulaciju paradoksa.

Nedeljko je trazio da navedem kog paradoksa. Ja sam rekao Curryevog. Onda su on i jos neki rekli da taj paradoks ne postoji, i da je to cista glupost i budalastina. Onda sam mu ja naveo naucnu literaturu koja govori drugacije.

Kada nije znao kako da mi odgovori, rekao je da sam ja glup, i da ja to ne razumem. I onda si se pojavio ti, koga je potreslo sto sam ja u pravu, verovatno ti je pritisak 300, i na svaki nacin pokusavas da me diskreditujes.

Ali ne govoris o naslovu teme, i ne pokusavas argumentima da pokazes da nije tacno ono sto govorim, nego govoris o meni, potpuno van teme i onoga o cemu govorimo i raspravljamo sad. Eto o tome se radi. U tome je stvar. To je istina.

Ne, već sam naveo mišljenja kredibilnijih od sebe.



Ne, već sam rekao da tu nema nikakvog paradoksa, osim prividnog. Ostalo je tvoj rečnik.



Opet izmišljaš. Gde sam napisao da si glup?

No, pošto pretpostavljam da si prikupio i pročitao literaturu na koju se pozivaš, molim te da mi citiraš relevantne pasuse iz tih publikacija. Bez toga se ne može argumentovano tvrditi šta u toj literaturi piše, a šta ne.

---